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ABSTRACT
The use of social media to communicate timely information
during crisis situations has become a common practice in re-
cent years. In particular, the one-to-many nature of Twitter
has created an opportunity for stakeholders to disseminate
crisis-relevant messages, and to access vast amounts of in-
formation they may not otherwise have. Our goal is to under-
stand what affected populations, response agencies and other
stakeholders can expect—and not expect—from these data
in various types of disaster situations. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that different types of crises elicit different reactions
from Twitter users, but we have yet to see whether this is in
fact the case. In this paper, we investigate several crises—
including natural hazards and human-induced disasters—in a
systematic manner and with a consistent methodology. This
leads to insights about the prevalence of different information
types and sources across a variety of crisis situations.
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INTRODUCTION
When a disaster occurs, time is limited and safety is in ques-
tion, so people need to act quickly with as much knowledge
of the situation as possible. It is becoming more common for
affected populations and other stakeholders to turn to Twitter
to gather information about a crisis when decisions need to
be made, and action taken. However, the millions of Twitter
messages (“tweets”) broadcast at any given time can be over-
whelming and confusing, and knowing what information to
look for is often difficult.
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One way to help those affected by a disaster to benefit from
information on Twitter, is to provide an indication of what in-
formation they can expect to find. The capacity for affected
populations to know what types of information they are likely
to see on Twitter when particular kinds of mass emergencies
occur, can potentially help them be more efficient in their
information-seeking and decision-making processes.
To explore this idea, we collected tweets that were broadcast
during 26 different crisis situations that took place in 2012
and 2013. For each crisis, we examine the types of informa-
tion that were posted, and look at the sources of the informa-
tion in each tweet. Our specific aim is to measure the preva-
lence of different types of messages under different types of
crisis situations.
Our results suggest that some intrinsic characteristics of the
crisis situations (e.g. being instantaneous or progressive) pro-
duce consistent effects on the types of information broadcast
on Twitter. The results are of interest to members of the pub-
lic, emergency managers, and formal response agencies, who
are increasingly trying to understand how to effectively use
social media as part of their information gathering processes.
Related Work
We know that tweets sent during crisis situations may contain
information that contributes to situational awareness [49], and
though disaster situations exhibit common features across
various events [47], previous research has found that infor-
mation shared on Twitter varies substantially from one cri-
sis to another [26, 33, 34]. Indeed, some variability across
disasters is expected. For instance, data from the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UN OCHA) shows that disasters in high-income countries
cause significantly more economic damage, but affect fewer
people and have fewer fatal casualties, compared to disasters
in countries with low or middle incomes [1].
Comparative research is an established discipline in commu-
nication studies [15], but to date, this method has not been
extensively applied to the study of social media communica-
tions during crises. There is little overlap in the crises exam-
ined across research groups, and no attempt to date to apply
the same methodology consistently to a large and diverse set
of crises. The literature review by Fraustino et al. [17] indi-
cates that research on social media during disasters “tends to
examine one catastrophic event (...) and then imply that the
findings are generalizable to other disasters.”
In our attempt to fill this gap, we examine tweets that were
broadcast during a broad range of different crisis situations,
and systematically apply the same methodology to the anal-
ysis of each event. This methodology is based on previous
work that categorizes tweets by type (including [2, 7, 24, 34,
50]) or by source (including [12, 14, 27, 29, 30, 44]).
Contributions
For decision-makers and other stakeholders to be as prepared
as possible, knowing what information they are likely to gain
from social media can save time and help them decide where
to direct their often limited resources. When stakeholders
know what types of content to expect (e.g., advice, sup-
port, damage reports), and which information sources will
be prevalent (e.g. news organizations, eyewitnesses, NGOs),
they do not have to sift through masses of social media posts;
instead, they have a reasonable expectation of what they will
find, and can then make more informed decisions regarding
their situational assessment process.
Based on our goal to ease the information overload wrought
by social media during crisis situations, the question we ad-
dress here is: what are the similarities and differences in
Twitter communications that take place during different crisis
events, according to specific characteristics of such events?
To answer this question, we study the prevalence of different
information types and sources found on Twitter during dif-
ferent types of crises, and correlate this with some of their
intrinsic characteristics.
Methodology Overview
To perform this study, we employ the following methodology:
Step 1: We determine a set of dimensions that allow us to
characterize different crises: hazard type, temporal devel-
opment, and geographic spread.
Step 2: We determine a set of dimensions to characterize so-
cial media messages during a crisis: informativeness, in-
formation type, and source.
Step 3: We collect Twitter data corresponding to 26 crises
that took place in 2012 and 2013, using retrospective sam-
pling on the 1% public data stream which is publicly avail-
able in the Internet Archive.1
Step 4: We create, run, and evaluate a series of crowdsourc-
ing tasks to perform content annotation on approximately
1,000 messages from each of the crises.
Step 5: We perform a statistical analysis of the dependencies
between types of crises and types of messages.
STEP 1: DETERMINING CRISIS DIMENSIONS
Given that our research question connects two domains: dis-
aster studies, and social media content analysis, the frame-
work we use is composed of two parts. We categorize the
crises according to a series of dimensions that characterize
them. Next, we annotate tweets from each crisis according to
dimensions that characterize different types of content.
When considering how to organize our data and approach our
annotation process, we turned to dimensions used in the soci-
ology of disaster research (p. 50 in [36]). For each crisis, we
1https://archive.org/details/twitterstream
consider hazard type (natural vs. human-induced), sub-type
(e.g. meteorological, hydrological, etc.), temporal develop-
ment (instantaneous vs. progressive), and geographic spread
(focalized vs. diffused).
C1. Hazard type
Hazard type is the first dimension we examine that may im-
pact the types of contents disseminated through social media.
The specific hazard types we consider are based on two tax-
onomies used in Europe2 and the US,3 as well as the tradi-
tional hazard categories listed by Fischer [16].
The first distinction is between those that are natural and
those that are human-induced. Sub-categories and examples
of each one are listed in Table 1. All sub-categories are cov-
ered by crises analyzed in this study, with the exception of the
“biological” category, which we were unable to sufficiently
account for regarding Twitter communications.
Table 1. Hazard categories and sub-categories.
Category Sub-category Examples
Natural
• Meteorological
• Hydrological
• Geophysical
• Climatological
• Biological (N/A)
• tornado, hurricane
• flood, landslide
• earthquake, volcano
• wildfire, heat/cold wave
• epidemic, infestation
Human-
Induced
• Intentional
• Accidental
• shooting, bombing
• derailment, building collapse
C2. Temporal Development
When considering the temporal development of crises, we
classify them as instantaneous (e.g. an earthquake or a shoot-
ing), or progressive (e.g. a hurricane or a heat wave) [3, 8, 35].
As we qualitatively coded the temporal aspects of the crises,
we labeled a disaster instantaneous if it “does not allow pre-
disaster mobilization of workers or pre-impact evacuation of
those in danger,” and progressive if it is “preceded by a warn-
ing period” [3].
C3. Geographic Spread
We look at the geographic spread of a crisis, and specify if
it is focalized (such as a train accident) or diffused (such as
a large earthquake) [3, 38]. A focalized crisis affects and
mobilizes response in a small area, while a diffused disas-
ter impacts a large geographic area and/or mobilizes national
or international response.
We recognize that this list of crisis dimensions is not exhaus-
tive. In particular, linguistic and cultural differences have
been shown to influence message content, and the adoption of
certain conventions in Twitter, e.g. [20, 37]. We also recog-
nize that these dimensions are not independent from one an-
other. For instance, with the exception of war and large-scale
nuclear disasters, most human-induced crises tend to be fo-
calized, while meteorological hazards are often diffused. Ad-
ditionally, the interplay between these dimensions may yield
complex results in terms of the types of information included
2http://www.emdat.be/classification
3http://www.ready.gov/be-informed
in Twitter messages, and the source of that information. For
example, hazard type combined with geographic spread can
affect public access to firsthand information about a crisis.
STEP 2: DETERMINING CONTENT DIMENSIONS
When assessing the tweets that were broadcast during each
disaster event, we turned to previous research on informa-
tion broadcast via social media in disaster. We constructed
a coarse-grained categorization that covers the categories of
information that are highly represented in previous work (in-
cluding [7, 24, 29, 49, 50] among others). Due to the large
number of events and messages we consider, and the limi-
tations of using crowdsourcing workers to perform the an-
notation (as opposed to experts, who would be prohibitively
expensive at this scale), we formulated basic information cat-
egories broad enough to be applicable to different crisis sit-
uations. The resulting categories and the previous research
represented by them, are shown in Table 2: informativeness,
information type, and source.
M1. Informativeness
We recognize that informativeness is a subjective concept, as
it depends on the person who is asking for or receiving infor-
mation. In addition, as with any communication, the context
in which the information exchange is taking place is critical
to understanding its implications. We capture this dimension
following [50], by checking whether the tweet contributes to
better understanding the situation on the ground. Accord-
ingly, we use the following annotation options:
A. Related to the crisis and informative: if it contains useful
information that helps understand the crisis situation.
B. Related to the crisis, but not informative: if it refers to the
crisis, but does not contain useful information that helps
understand the situation.
C. Not related to the crisis.
M2. Information Type
As we closely analyzed a set of samples of messages commu-
nicated via Twitter during disasters, we found that the type
of content often varies substantially across hazards; a finding
corroborated by many other studies [2, 7, 24, 34, 50].
To identify a set of broad categories whose incidence (though
with different degrees of occurrence) is to a large extent in-
dependent of event specificities, and to obtain a manageable
coding scheme, we first identified the list of information cat-
egories used in related work studying various types of events
(e.g., wildfires [50], drug wars [29], floods [6, 45], earth-
quake [39], nuclear power plant [46], to name a few). Then,
we proceeded with merging in a bottom-up fashion those cat-
egories that overlap and/or are related. Finally, we gathered
the remaining categories, typically accounting for informa-
tion specific to each crisis or type of crisis (e.g., flood level,
weather, wind, visibility [50]), into a “catchall” category—
other useful information. The exact matching of information
types present in the related work to each of the categories
used in this paper is depicted in Table 2. The information
types that we use are:
Table 2. Typologies of content used in this paper, and their relationship
to some aspects mentioned in previous work
This work Related categories from previous work
Informativeness:
Informative informative (direct or indirect) [24]; curating or producing
content [29]; contribute to situational awareness [50]; sit-
uational information [40]; contextual information to better
understand the situation [42]
Not inform. trolling [29]; humor [28]; off-topic [34, 39, 45]; ru-
mor [22]; humor or irrelevant/spam [42]
Information type:
Affected
individuals
medical emergency, people trapped, person news [7]; ca-
sualties (and damage), people missing, found or seen [24];
reports about self [2]; fatality, injury, missing [49]; look-
ing for missing people [39];
Infrastruc.
& utilities
(casualties and) damage [24]; reports about environ-
ment [2]; built environment [49]; damaged, closures
and services [22]; collapsed structure, water short-
age/sanitation, hospital/clinic services [7]; road closures
and traffic conditions [48];
Donations
& volunteer.
donations of money, goods or services [24]; donations or
volunteering [34]; requesting help, proposing relief, re-
lief coordination [39]; donations, relief, resources [22];
help and fundraising [6, 40]; shelter needed, food short-
age/distribution [7]; volunteer information [50]; help re-
quests [2]
Caution
& advice
caution, advice [24]; warnings [2]; advice, warnings,
preparation [34]; warning, advice, caution, prepara-
tion [50]; tips [28]; safety, preparation, status, proto-
col [22]; preparedness [51]; advice [6]; advice and instruc-
tions [40]; predicting or forecasting, instructions to handle
certain situations [42];
Sympathy
& emo. sup.
concerns and condolences [2]; gratitude, prayers [34];
emotion-related [39]; support [22]; thanks and gratitude,
support [6, 40];
Other
useful info.
fire line/emergency location, flood level, weather, wind,
visibility [50]; smoke, ash [48]; adjunctive and meta-
discussions [40]; other informative messages [34]; in-
formation verification, explanation of particular prob-
lems [42];
Source:
Eyewitness citizen reporters, members of the community [29]; eyewit-
nesses [6, 14, 27, 34]; local, peripheral, personally con-
nected [45]; local individuals [43, 50]; local perspective,
on the ground reports [46]; direct experience (personal
narrative and eyewitness reports) [40]; direct observation,
direct impact, relayed observation [48];
Government (news organizations and) authorities [29]; govern-
ment/administration [34]; police and fire services [22]; po-
lice [13]; government [6]; public institutions [46]; public
service agencies, flood specific agencies [45];
NGOs non-profit organizations [12, 46]; non-governmental orga-
nization [34]; faith-based organizations [45];
Business commercial organizations [12]; enterprises [46]; for-profit
corporation [34];
Media news organizations (and authorities), blogs [29]; journal-
ists, media, and bloggers [12, 14]; news organization [34];
professional news reports [28]; media [6]; traditional me-
dia (print, television, radio), alternative media, freelance
journalist [46]; blogs, news-crawler bots, local, national
and alternative media [45]; media sharing (news media
updates, multimedia) [40];
Outsiders sympathizers [27]; distant witness [9]; remote crowd [43];
non-locals [45, 46].
A. Affected individuals: deaths, injuries, missing, found, or
displaced people, and/or personal updates.
B. Infrastructure and utilities: buildings, roads, utili-
ties/services that are damaged, interrupted, restored or op-
erational.
C. Donations and volunteering: needs, requests, or offers of
money, blood, shelter, supplies, and/or services by volun-
teers or professionals.
D. Caution and advice: warnings issued or lifted, guidance
and tips.
E. Sympathy and emotional support: thoughts, prayers, grat-
itude, sadness, etc.
F. Other useful information not covered by any of the above
categories.
M3. Source
When people turn to Twitter to learn about a disaster, they
are often concerned with the source of information. Hence,
we focused on content source, which may be different from
tweet author; e.g. if the Twitter account of a large media orga-
nization quotes a government official, the “source” is the gov-
ernment official. Sources are categorized as: primary sources
(eyewitness accounts) or secondary or tertiary sources (typ-
ically mainstream media or others engaged in journalistic
acts) [12, 14, 27, 29, 30, 44].
For the former, we chose to broaden the definition of an eye-
witness account as originating from “a person who has seen
something happen and can give a first-hand description of
it”4 to also accommodate those cases when the account does
not include a direct observation, yet the user is personally
impacted by the event, or it “is about a direct observation
or impact of a person who is not the micro-blogger” [48]—
typically relaying the observations of friends or family.
In the latter case, we can find several organizations who of-
ten aggregate information about a crisis, including business,
governmental, and non-governmental sources:
A. Eyewitness: information originating from eyewitnesses of
the event or of response/recovery operations, or from their
family, friends, neighbors, etc.
B. Government: information originating from the local or
national administration.
C. Non-governmental organization: information originating
from NGOs.
D. Business: information originating from for-profit business
(except news organizations).
E. Traditional and/or Internet media: information coming
from sources such as TV, radio, news organizations, web
blogs, or journalists.
F. Outsiders: information originating from individuals that
are not personally involved/affected by the event.
STEP 3: DATA COLLECTION
List of Events
Table 3 shows our datasets, which are available for research
purposes at http://crisislex.org/. They correspond to a set of
4http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/eyewitness
26 events during 2012 and 2013, and which spawned signif-
icant activity on Twitter. Table 3 also includes crisis dimen-
sions of hazard type, development, and spread (we consider
the Singapore haze to be partially human-induced due to in-
tentional fires to clear land). We note that in our dataset, all
human-induced crises are focalized and instantaneous, while
all natural hazards are diffused, but may be instantaneous or
progressive.
To obtain our list of events, we started with a set of disas-
ters compiled mainly from Wikipedia.5 We then filtered it by
choosing events that had at least 100,000 tweets associated
with them—which is reflected by at least 1,000 tweets in the
1% public data stream we used.
Floods are the most frequent type of natural hazard in our
data, and also the natural hazard that affects the most people
in the world. According to data from the United Nations for
the 2002–2011 period, an average of 116 million people were
affected by a flood every year, followed by 72 million people
a year affected by drought, 40 million by storms, 9 million by
extreme temperatures, and 8 million by earthquakes [1].
Data Sampling
Our data collection method is shaped by limitations to data
access through Twitter, and is based on first collecting a
base data sample and then retrospectively sub-sampling it.
The base data sample was obtained by constantly monitoring
Twitter’s public stream via Twitter’s Sample API, which con-
sists of a sample of approximately 1% of all tweets6 and it is
accessible via Internet Archive7, allowing full reproducibility
of this work. In the 2012-2013 period, this collection contains
on average about 132 million tweets (amounting to 38 GB of
compressed data) per month. The quality of Twitter data sam-
ples acquired via the publicly available APIs that offer lim-
ited access to the full Twitter stream has been studied exten-
sively, to understand the nature of the biases of such data sam-
ples [18, 19, 25, 31, 32]. Yet, while [32] have shown biases
with respect to hashtag and topic prevalence in the Streaming
API (which we do not use in this study), [31] shows that the
data obtained via the Sample API closely resemble the ran-
dom samples over the full Twitter stream, which corroborates
the specifications of this API. Additionally, given the daily
volume of tweets “the 1% endpoint would provide a represen-
tative and high resolution sample with a maximum margin of
error of 0.06 at a confidence level of 99%, making the study
of even relatively small subpopulations within that sample a
realistic option” [18].
The sub-samples are obtained by running keyword searches
over the base data—keyword searches that mimic the way
in which Twitter does keyword tracking to obtain a sample
of the data that one can obtain in real time.8 An advantage
of this retrospective sampling method is that one can capture
the entire period of the event, which is not the case for other
5From the list of significant events per month, e.g. for January 2013
we consulted http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_2013
6https://dev.twitter.com/docs/api/1.1/get/statuses/sample
7https://archive.org/details/twitterstream
8https://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-apis/parameters#track
Table 3. List of crises studied, sorted by date, including the duration of the collection period for each dataset, the number of tweets collected, and several
dimensions of the crises
Hazard Hazard Hazard
Year Country Crisis Name Days Tweets category subcategory type Development Spread
2012 Italy Italy earthquakes 32 7.4K Natural Geophysical Earthquake Instantaneous Diffused
2012 US Colorado wildfires 31 4.2K Natural Climatological Wildfire Progressive Diffused
2012 Philipinnes Philipinnes floods 13 3.0K Natural Hydrological Floods Progressive Diffused
2012 Venezuela Venezuela refinery explosion 12 2.7K Human-induced Accidental Explosion Instantaneous Focalized
2012 Costa Rica Costa Rica earthquake 13 2.2K Natural Geophysical Earthquake Instantaneous Diffused
2012 Guatemala Guatemala earthquake 20 3.3K Natural Geophysical Earthquake Instantaneous Diffused
2012 Phillipines Typhoon Pablo 21 1.9K Natural Meteorological Typhoon Progressive Diffused
2013 Brazil Brazil nightclub fire 16 4.8K Human-induced Accidental Fire Instantaneous Focalized
2013 Australia Queensland floods 19 1.2K Natural Hydrological Floods Progressive Diffused
2013 Russia Russian meteor 19 8.4K Natural Others Meteorite Instantaneous Focalized
2013 US Boston bombings 60 157.5K Human-induced Intentional Bombings Instantaneous Focalized
2013 Bangladesh Savar building collapse 36 4.1K Human-induced Accidental Collapse Instantaneous Focalized
2013 US West Texas explosion 29 14.5K Human-induced Accidental Explosion Instantaneous Focalized
2013 Canada Alberta floods 25 5.9K Natural Hydrological Floods Progressive Diffused
2013 Singapore Singapore haze 19 3.6K Mixed Others Haze Progressive Diffused
2013 Canada Lac-Megantic train crash 14 2.3K Human-induced Accidental Derailment Instantaneous Focalized
2013 Spain Spain train crash 15 3.7K Human-induced Accidental Derailment Instantaneous Focalized
2013 Phillipines Manila floods 11 2.0K Natural Hydrological Floods Progressive Diffused
2013 US Colorado floods 21 1.8K Natural Hydrological Floods Progressive Diffused
2013 Australia Australia wildfires 21 2.0K Natural Climatological Wildfire Progressive Diffused
2013 Phillipines Bohol earthquake 12 2.2K Natural Geophysical Earthquake Instantaneous Diffused
2013 UK Glasgow helicopter crash 30 2.6K Human-induced Accidental Crash Instantaneous Focalized
2013 US LA Airport shootings 12 2.7K Human-induced Intentional Shootings Instantaneous Focalized
2013 US NYC train crash 8 1.1K Human-induced Accidental Derailment Instantaneous Focalized
2013 Italy Sardinia floods 13 1.1K Natural Hydrological Floods Progressive Diffused
2013 Phillipines Typhoon Yolanda 58 39.0K Natural Meteorological Typhoon Progressive Diffused
collections built during the disasters, which generally lack the
first minutes or hours of the event.
Keywords were selected following standard practices com-
monly used for this type of data collection [6, 23, 34, 46],
and typically include hashtags or terms that pair the canon-
ical name of the disaster with proper names of the affected
locations (e.g., Manila floods, #newyork derailment), the
proper names of the meteorological phenomena (e.g., Hurri-
cane Sandy), or, at times, hashtags promoted by governments,
response agencies, or news media. Previous work has shown
that this method produces a sample of messages whose distri-
bution of information categories closely resembles the sam-
pling by other methods e.g. geofencing, which samples all
tweets from users in the affected area [34].
To identify the keywords/hashtags used during each event,
one of the authors used a search engine to lookup for “Hash-
tags 〈Event Name〉.” The search results often included news
articles discussing the social media use during the searched
event,9 resources from NGOs using social media for cri-
sis management,10 Internet media platforms,11 governmen-
tal resources on social media use12 or research papers [6,
34]. Using these resources, we built an initial list of hash-
tags/keywords, which we further validated and iteratively im-
9http://mashable.com/2012/06/29/colorado-wildfire-social-media/,
http://www.techinasia.com/singapore-haze-infographic/ and others.
10http://wiki.crisiscommons.eu/wiki/Crises, http://crisiswiki.org/
11http://twitchy.com/2014/07/07/earthquake-hits-southern-
mexico-and-guatemala-fatalities-damage-reported-pics/,
https://storify.com/ABC13Houston/plant-explosion-in-west-texas
12http://www.gov.ph/2013/11/09/online-efforts-for-typhoon-
yolanda/
proved by manually searching for them on Twitter. In those
cases in which the hashtag/keyword had been used for other
purposes, we also looked for the combination of the hash-
tag/keyword, and the event name. When other keywords
frequently appear with those already on our list, we also
searched for them in Twitter. If there were at least few in-
stances in which they appeared in relevant tweets without the
other keywords, we added them to the list. The size of the
resulting keywords lists vary, yet [34] suggests that keywords
lists of various sizes retrieve collections which exhibit com-
parable representativeness with respect to a reference sample.
For the instantaneous hazards we start the collection from
the moment when the event happen, while for the progressive
hazards we start from the moment the hazard was detected
(e.g., when a storm formed for a hurricane). The volume of
tweets in each collection decreases after onset, but we con-
tinue collecting data until that volume stabilizes to a low value
(specifically, when the standard deviation of the daily number
of tweets becomes less than 5).
As a post-processing step, we remove very short tweets (i.e.
those made up of 3 tokens or less), as they are in general hard
to classify and rarely contain any useful information. We do
not remove near-duplicates or re-tweets (RTs) because we are
interested in the extent to which people repeat and pass along
existing messages.
STEP 4: CROWDSOURCED DATA ANNOTATION
We employed crowdsource workers to perform manual anno-
tation of our datasets in April and May 2014.13 The workers
13We employed workers through the crowdsourcing platform Crowd-
Flower: http://crowdflower.com/
were provided with detailed instructions and examples of cor-
rectly labeled tweets, so they could successfully complete the
annotation task.
Task Description
Below are the instructions given during the annotation phase
to crowdsource workers. “You,” in the task description refers
to the crowdsourcing worker. The underlined parts, and the
examples, changed for each crisis.
M1. Informativeness. The instructions used for this anno-
tation task are shown below, and include examples for each
class.
Categorize tweets posted during the 2013 Colorado floods. Please read
them carefully, following links as necessary, and categorize them as:
A. Related to the floods and informative: if it contains useful informa-
tion that helps you understand the situation:
– “RT @NWSBoulder Significant flooding at the Justice Center in
#boulderflood”
– “Flash floods wash away homes, kill at least one near Boulder via
@NBCnews”
B. Related to the floods, but not informative: if it refers to the crisis,
but does not contain useful information that helps you understand the
situation:
– “Pray for Boulder, Colorado #boulderflood”
C. Not related to the floods:
– “#COstorm you are a funny guy lol”
D. Not applicable; too short; not readable; or other issues.
M2. Information Type. Instructions and examples:
Categorize tweets posted during the 2012 Colorado wildfires. Please
read them carefully, following links as necessary, and categorize as:
A. Affected individuals: information about deaths, injuries, missing,
trapped, found or displaced people, including personal updates about
oneself, family, or others.
– “Up to 100,000 people face evacuation in Colorado”
B. Infrastructure and utilities: information about buildings, roads, util-
ities/services that are damaged, interrupted, restored or operational.
– “Officials working the #HighParkFire confirmed that several roads
are closed”
C. Donations and volunteering: information about needs, requests,
queries or offers of money, blood, shelter, supplies (e.g., food, water,
clothing, medical supplies) and/or services by volunteers or profes-
sionals.
– “#Offer Storage Space http://t.co/... #COwildfire”
D. Caution and advice: information about warnings issued or lifted,
guidance and tips.
– Wildfire warnings issued for six counties Sunday - http://t.co/...”
E. Sympathy and emotional support: thoughts, prayers, gratitude, sad-
ness, etc.
– “Pray for Boulder #COwildfire”
F. Other useful information NOT covered by any of the above cate-
gories.
– “To track fire activity in CO, check this site @inciweb Colorado In-
cidents http://t.co/...”
G. Not applicable; not readable;not related to the crisis.
M3. Source. Instructions and examples:
Categorize tweets posted during the 2013 Queensland floods
(Australia). Please read them carefully, following links as necessary,
and indicate the most likely source of information for them as:
A. Eyewitness: if the information originates from eyewitnesses to the
event or to response/recovery operations, or from their family, friends,
neighbors, etc. :
– “Just found out my mum is trapped at home, no water, no power,
tree’s down across roads out of her property near glasshouse mtns”
– “Outside sounds like it is going to shatter my bedroom windows any
sec now #bigwet #qld”
B. Government: if the information originates from national, regional
or local government agencies, police, hospitals, and/or military.
– “PRT @theqldpremier: UPDATE SCHOOL CLOSURES: An
updated school closures list is available now at http://t.co/...”
C. Non-government: if the information originates from non-
governmental and not for profit organizations such as RedCross, UN,
UNICEF, etc.
– “RT @RedCrossAU: Everyone affected by #qldfloods, let people
know you’re safe: http://t.co/...”
D. Businesses: if the information originates from for-profit business
or corporations such as Starbucks, Walmart, etc.
– “RT @starbucks: With many partners impacted by OLD floods,
consider making (or increasing) donations”
E. Traditional and/or Internet news or blogs: if the information
originates from television channels, radio channels, newspapers,
websites or blogs such as CNN, KODA, New York Times, etc.
– “RT @ABCNews24: #QLDfloods watch: Authorities are preparing
for tornadoes in southeast Queensland.”
F. Outsiders: if the information originates from individuals that have
NO acquaintances affected by the event, nor are they associate with
any organization.
– “RT @TheBushVerandah: Just heard a farmer had to shoot approx
100 sows at mundubbera ... In preference to them drowning”
G. Not applicable; not readable; not related to the crisis.
Task Characteristics
For all annotation tasks, we provide examples both in English
and the language most commonly used to communicate about
the event (if there was a common language used other than
English.) Regarding worker selection, the platform we used
for crowdsourcing allows us to select workers by country (but
not at a sub-country level), so we specified that workers must
be from the country where the event took place. In few cases
when there were not enough workers to perform the task, we
also included workers from neighboring countries having the
same official language. We selected workers in this way to en-
sure that they understand the tweets posted by individuals lo-
cal to the event, and that they would be more likely able to un-
derstand dialects, references to regional and/or local places,
and overall be versed in the culture of the area in which the
event took place. Additionally, following standard guidelines
from this crowdsourcing platform, 20 to 30 tweets per crisis
and task were classified by the authors of this paper. We con-
sider all workers whose assessments differ significantly from
ours (less than 70% of agreement) as untrusted.
Workers were presented with the tweet text, including any
links (which they were invited to follow), and then asked to
choose a single category that best matched the content of the
tweet. To avoid potential ethical concerns on behalf of Twit-
ter users who are likely unaware that their tweets are being
collected and analyzed, workers did not have access to the
author username, nor the time at which the tweet was sent.
In addition, we avoid possible privacy violations by not dis-
playing the username nor the profile picture of persons af-
fected by a given disaster. This practice follows customary
procedures used for using crowdsourced annotation of text
messages for both information type [4, 10, 24, 34] and infor-
mation source [14, 34].
Trusted workers took from 10 to 12 seconds to label each
tweet (in terms of interquartile mean, which is the figure re-
ported by the crowdsourcing platform). We collect labels
from at least 3 different trusted workers per tweet and task,
and determine the final label of the tweet by simple majority.
About 15-20 trusted workers participated in each classifica-
tion step (i.e. a set of 1,000 tweets from a single event and
with a single question M1, M2, or M3), with the bulk of the
work being done by about 10 of them in each case—with no
worker labeling more than 300 items in a classification task,
a limit set by us following recommendations from the crowd-
sourcing provider. The total amount paid to the crowdsourc-
ing platform for the 3 classification tasks was approximately
$35 (USD) per event. Payments to specific individual work-
ers depend on how many tasks they performed and on their
agreement with the test questions, following an internal pro-
cedure of the crowdsourcing provider.
Our first classification task is to identify tweets which are re-
lated to a crisis. A tweet may contain a crisis’ keywords but
be unrelated to it, as some keywords may be quite general,
and refer to any number of topics other than the disaster sit-
uation. In addition, unscrupulous spammers sometimes ex-
ploit the popularity of a crisis hashtag to post promotional
content [5]. As a result, the first labeling phase (M1) also has
a data cleaning role. For each event we label a set of 1,000
tweets selected uniformly at random. We imposed a mini-
mum threshold of 900 crisis-related tweets per crisis, and in
the cases where it was necessary (9 out of 26 crises), we con-
tinued labeling tweets until passing the threshold. Next, we
kept only the tweets that were related to the crisis (indepen-
dently of whether they were deemed informative or not), and
classified them with respect to information types (M2) and
sources (M3).
Task Evaluation
Tweet classification is a subjective process, especially when
performed at a large scale, and with a focus on tweet content.
To evaluate to what extent subjectivity affects our results, we
performed the following experiment: Two authors indepen-
dently labeled 200 tweets sampled uniformly at random from
all the crises. They classified tweets according to informa-
tion types and sources, by looking at the content of the tweets
as displayed in the Twitter platform, including conversations
(if any), and looking at links in the tweets, and user profile
information from its authors. We also note that authors had
background information about each of the events.
We measure inter-assessor agreement with Cohen’s Kappa,
resulting in κ = 0.80 for information type (95% confidence
interval CI: [0.73, 0.87]) and κ = 0.73 for source (95% CI:
[0.64, 0.81]). Customarily, values in this range indicate sub-
stantial agreement.
Next, we take all tweets in which both authors agree and
compare their joint label with those provided by crowdsource
workers. The results are κ = 0.81 (95% CI: [0.73, 0.88])
for information type and κ = 0.72 for source (95% CI:
[0.62, 0.83]). Again, these values reflect substantial agree-
ment. The individual agreement of authors with workers
(which includes cases in which the labels given by authors
do not agree) is lower but still substantial (κ = 0.69 and
κ = 0.74 for information type, κ = 0.57 and κ = 0.63
for source).
The conclusion is similar to that of previous work using
crowdsourcing labeling (e.g. [14, 41]), crowdsource workers
collectively provide reliable labels for social media annota-
tion tasks, at a volume that would be very costly to achieve
by other means (in our case, 26×1, 000×3 = 78, 000 labels).
This experiment also allows us to evaluate the biases of
crowdsourcing labeling. For information type, in 15% of the
cases the crowdsourced label does not correspond to the one
given by the authors (among the authors this discrepancy is
16%). The most common error of crowdsourcing workers
is labeling “Caution and Advice” messages as either “Dona-
tions and Volunteering” or “Other Useful Information.” For
information source, in 17% of the cases the crowdsourced la-
bel did not agree with the one of the authors (among authors
this discrepancy is 18%). The most common error was label-
ing “Eyewitness” as “Outsiders” or “Media.” This means that
in the analysis, we have to consider that “Caution and Ad-
vice” and “Eyewitness” may be underrepresented categories,
while the other categories we mentioned may be overrep-
resented. The extent of the total underrepresentation/over-
representation across all categories, however, is about 15%-
17%, and more importantly, is not larger than the discrepancy
among the two authors who performed this evaluation.
STEP 5: DATA ANALYSIS
The final step is to perform an analysis of the data annotated
by the crowdsourcing workers. We begin by presenting re-
sults about the overall distribution of content types across
crises, which we connect to the crisis dimensions by mining
association rules. Then we consider temporal aspects, as well
as the interplay between content dimensions.
Finally, we show that while substantial variability exists, sim-
ilar crises tend to have a similar distribution of message types.
Though we make no claims that these 26 crises are represen-
tative of every event of every type we consider, we do note
patterns and consistencies in the proportion of different mes-
sages, and present potential explanations about them, to serve
as foundations for future explorations.
Content Types vs. Crisis Dimensions
We first present our results regarding relationships between
crisis dimensions and the prevalence of categories of infor-
mation found in tweets.
Informativeness
The proportion of messages in each collection that were
found to be about the crisis at hand (i.e. classified in the
first two categories of M1) was on average 89% (min. 64%,
max. 100%). In this case, one of the most significant factors
is whether the keywords/hashtags adopted by people tweet-
ing about the crisis are specific to the event, or were used for
other purposes. For instance, #yolandaph was specifically
used for Typhoon Yolanda, while #dhaka (the name of the
capital of Bangladesh) was used after the Savar building col-
lapse, but also for other purposes.
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Figure 1. Distributions of information types and sources (best seen in color)
Among these messages, the proportion of informative mes-
sages (i.e. those in the first category of M1) was on aver-
age 69% (min. 44%, max. 92%). Most of the messages con-
sidered “not informative” contained expressions of sympathy
and emotional support (e.g. “thoughts and prayers”).
Information types
Figure 1(a) shows the distribution of information types found
in the tweets related to each crisis. Below, we sort the cate-
gories in decreasing order of average prevalence, noting the
(wide) range on the proportion of each type.
• Other useful information: 32% on average (min. 7%,
max. 59%). This “catchall” category is the largest among
the information types. An analyst interested exclusively in
the remaining categories can skip these messages on the
initial pass of analysis. We note that the events in which
this category was the least prevalent (i.e., the other cate-
gories accounted for more than 80% of the messages) were
all diffused. While we do not claim that all, or even most,
diffused events will have fewer-than-average amounts of
“other useful information" tweets, it is potentially useful to
know that this type of tweet is not prevalent in the diffused
events we studied.
The information captured by the “other useful information”
category varies significantly across events. For instance, in
the Boston bombings and LA Airport shootings in 2013,
there are updates about the investigation and suspects; in
the West Texas explosion and the Spain train crash, we find
details about the accidents and the follow-up inquiry; in
earthquakes, we find seismological details.
• Sympathy and emotional support: 20% on average
(min. 3%, max. 52%). Tweets that express sympathy are
present in all the events we examined. The 4 crises in
which the messages in this category were more prevalent
(above 40%) were all instantaneous disasters. Again, we
make no hard-and-fast claims about all instantaneous dis-
asters, but this finding leads us to conjecture that people
are more likely to offer sympathy when events are not pre-
dicted, take people by surprise, and may cause additional
distress due to their unforeseen occurrence.
• Affected individuals: 20% on average (min. 5%,
max. 57%). The 5 crises with the largest proportion of
this type of information (28%–57%) were human-induced,
focalized, and instantaneous. These 5 events can also be
viewed as particularly emotionally shocking. They resulted
in casualties, but a small enough number of casualties to
generate many reports regarding specific individuals who
lost their lives or suffered injuries.
• Donations and volunteering: 10% on average (min. 0%,
max. 44%). The number of tweets describing needs or
offers of goods and services in each event varies greatly;
some events have no mention of them, while for others,
this is one of the largest information categories. In our data,
tweets about donations and volunteering were more preva-
lent in Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 (44%) and in the floods
in Sardinia, Colorado, Alberta, and Manila in 2013, and in
the Philippines in 2012 (16%–38%). In contrast, they were
10% or less for all the human-induced crises we analyzed.
• Caution and advice: 10% on average (min. 0%,
max. 34%). In instantaneous crises, there is unsurpris-
ingly little information on this type (0%–8%), as these
events are often not predicted and only post-impact ad-
vice can be present. The only exceptions in our data are
the Italy earthquakes in 2012 (17%) — in which the col-
lection covers two earthquakes plus a number of signif-
icant aftershocks which happen over an interval of less
than 10 days, and Costa Rica earthquake in 2012 (34%) —
when tsunami alerts were issued across Central America
and parts of South America including even distant coun-
tries like Chile. Apart from these two events, the events
with the most tweets that include information about cau-
tion and advice are caused by diffused natural hazards, and
the 5 with the highest fraction from this set are all pro-
gressive (22%–31%). Further, baring the meteor that fell
in Russia in 2013, we can see a clear separation between
human-induced hazards and natural: all human induced
events have less caution and advice tweets (0%–3%) than
all the events due to natural hazards (4%–31%). The me-
teor was a rare event that felt like a bomb whose shock
wave shattered windows and damaged thousands of build-
ings, remaining undetected before its atmospheric entry.14
• Infrastructure and utilities: 7% on average (min. 0%,
max. 22%). The crises where this type of information was
more than 10% were the Queensland, Alberta, and Col-
orado floods of 2013, and the Venezuela refinery explosion
in 2012. In flood situations, it is common for electricity
and water supplies to be cut, and in the case of the refinery
explosion, many living in the area were suddenly without
electricity due to the massive impact of the discharge.
Sources
In Figure 1(b), we see the distribution of tweet sources, and
we observe the following:
• Traditional and/or Internet media: 42% on average
(min. 18%, max. 77%). Regardless of the event, tradi-
tional and Internet media have a large presence on Twitter,
in many cases more than 30% of the tweets. The 6 crises
with the highest fraction of tweets coming from a media
source (54%–76%) are instantaneous, which make “break-
ing news” in the media.
• Outsiders: 38% on average (min. 3%, max. 65%). Depend-
ing on the event, the number of “outsiders” can vary. This
was in general about 18% or more, with the exception of
the Singapore haze in 2013 that had only 3% of tweets from
outsiders. The Singapore haze was an event that strongly
disrupted the city, but did not result in life-threatening in-
juries or deaths.
• Eyewitness accounts: 9% on average (min. 0%,
max. 54%). In general, we find a larger proportion of eye-
witness accounts during diffused disasters caused by natu-
ral hazards. The 12 events with the highest percentage of
14http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chelyabinsk_meteor
eyewitness accounts are all diffused (6%–54%) and the top
6 are also progressive (13%–54%).
• Government: 5% on average (min. 1%, max. 13%). A rela-
tively small fraction of tweets include information sourced
by government officials and agencies—only for two of the
crises we analyze this exceeds 10%. We surmise that this is
because governments must verify information before they
broadcast it, which takes considerable time [21]. There-
fore, government accounts may not have the most up-to-
date information in crisis situations. The 7 events with the
highest percentage of tweets from governmental agencies
are due to natural-hazards, progressive and diffused (7%-
13%), which are the cases when the governments intervene
to issue or lift warnings or alerts.
• NGOs: 4% on average (min. 0%, max. 17%). Like gov-
ernments, NGOs are also careful to broadcast only verified
information. In the human-induced crises we studied there
is little NGO activity in Twitter (≈ 4% or less). The high-
est levels of NGO tweets are seen in natural disasters and
all those in which the fraction of such tweets was 6% or
more are typhoons and floods.
• Business: 2% on average (min. 0%, max. 9%). For the
most part, we do not see a large amount of tweet activity
from businesses in the disaster situations we studied. The
proportion is below 5% for all crises except the Alberta
floods in 2013 with 9% of tweets. Furthermore, with only
one exception—the Glasgow helicopter crash—the crises
with 3% or more tweets from business were diffused.
Association Rules
To systematically search for relationships between the char-
acteristics of crises and the messages in Twitter, we applied
an association-rules mining method [11]. To err in the side of
caution, we report only the automatically-discovered associ-
ation rules that are valid for more than 20 out of the 26 crises.
To apply this method to numerical data, each category in the
information types and sources was divided into two classes:
above the median, and below the median.
For information types, we found one rule that is valid for 24
out of 26 of the crises: when the geographical spread is dif-
fused, the proportion of caution and advice tweets is above
the median, and when it is focalized, the proportion of cau-
tion and advice tweets is below the median. For sources, we
found one rule that is valid for 21 out of 26 of the crises:
human-induced accidental events tend to have a number of
eyewitness tweets below the median, in comparison with in-
tentional and natural hazards.
Both rules are possibly related to different levels of access to
the area affected by the event and to its surroundings.
Content Redundancy
We next look at content redundancy. Heuristically, we con-
sider two tweets to be near-duplicates if their longest common
subsequence was 75% or more of the length of the shortest
tweet. Among the sources of information, messages origi-
nating from non-governmental organizations and government
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Figure 2. Average distribution of tweets across crises into combinations
of information types (rows) and sources (columns). Rows and columns
are sorted by total frequency, starting on the bottom-left corner. The
cells in this figure add up to 100%.
sources tended to show more redundancy, with the top 3 mes-
sages (and their near-duplicates) accounting for ≈20%-22%
of the tweets. Among information types, messages of caution
and advice, and those containing information about infras-
tructure and utilities, were the most repeated ones, with the
top 3 messages (and their near-duplicates) comprising ≈12-
14% of the tweets.
Types and Sources
Some information types are more frequently associated with
particular sources, as shown in Figure 2, in which each
〈type, source〉 cell depicts the probability that a tweet has that
specific combination of information type and source. NGOs
and business are more frequently the source of tweets related
to donations and volunteering, mostly to ask for resources
and request volunteer work (NGOs), or to announce free or
discounted goods or services for those affected by a disaster
(business).
Tweets from governments are often messages of caution and
advice, such as tornado alerts; this agrees with observations
in [51] where “preparedness” is the larger category used by
government communications. Instead, eyewitness tweets fo-
cus on affected individuals. Both government and eyewit-
ness tweets also frequently include a variety of messages that
belong to the “other useful information” category. Outsider
messages are predominantly about sympathy and support.
Finally, tweets from traditional and Internet media offer a
variety of information types including information about af-
fected individuals, and messages of caution and advice. Me-
dia are also the most prominent source of information regard-
ing infrastructure and utilities.
Temporal Aspects
We study how the volume of different categories of messages
evolves over time, as shown in Tables 5 and 6 (at the end of
the paper). We separated crises according to their temporal
development (instantaneous vs. progressive), depicting us-
ing “spark lines” the total volume of messages over time, and
the total volume of messages in each information type and
source.15 This analysis focuses on the differences between
the average timestamps of messages in different information
categories.16
In terms of information types, the messages that arrive first
are those of caution and advice, and sympathy and support,
roughly in the first 12–24 hours after the peak of the crisis.
This is particularly evident in instantaneous crises. Then,
messages about affected individuals and infrastructure are
most frequent. The last messages to appear are those related
to donations and volunteering. Interestingly, this follows the
progression in the stages of a crisis from emergency response
to early recovery actions [47].
In terms of sources, there are differences depending on the
type of temporal development. In instantaneous crises, out-
siders, media and NGO messages appear early, with other
sources following (the temporal position of eyewitness mes-
sages varies substantially depending on crisis type). On the
other hand, during progressive crises, eyewitness and govern-
ment messages appear early, mostly to warn and advice those
in the affected areas, while NGO messages appear relatively
late. In addition, there is an interesting temporal complemen-
tarity between messages from governments and NGOs that
merits to be studied in depth in future work.
Crisis Similarity
In further seeking links between disaster characteristics and
tweet content and source, we apply an unsupervised method;
specifically, hierarchical agglomerative clustering. Perform-
ing this clustering uncovered groups of crises that have sim-
ilar content distribution. Given that we compare probabil-
ity distributions, to measure the similarity between two crisis
events we use Bhattacharyya distance (for two discrete dis-
tributions p and q this is − ln(∑c∈C√p(c)q(c)) where C is
the set of all classes) which quantifies the overlap between
two statistical samples. To combine clusters of crises, we
used complete-linkage clustering, which merges those clus-
ters for which the distance between their furthest elements is
the smallest.
Figure 3(a) shows the resulting dendrogram when the clus-
tering is done according to the distribution of information
types. We see two large clusters: first, the cluster on the
bottom is dominated by human-induced crises, while in the
one on the top there are only natural hazards. This indi-
cates that, despite the significant variations we have shown,
human-induced crises are more similar to each other in terms
of the types of information disseminated through Twitter than
to natural hazards.
Second, events also cluster depending on how they devel-
oped. The cluster at the bottom includes instantaneous events,
with one exception: the Colorado wildfires in 2012. This
exception may be due to the nature of this particular fire.
The combination of heat, drought conditions, and high winds
15Each point in the spark line corresponds to a calendar day, which
explains why in some instantaneous crises the overall curve goes up
at the beginning (when the crisis occurs at night).
16Peak, average, and median timestamps for each time series in Ta-
bles 5 and 6 are available in our data release.
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Figure 3. Dendrograms obtained by hierarchical agglomerative clustering of crises. The length of the branch points reflect the similarity among crises.
We remark that the clusters do not reflect similar messages, but instead similarities in terms of the proportion of different information types and sources
in each crisis.
caused the fire to quickly develop, and it claimed 350 houses
in just over 12 hours. The cluster on the top includes progres-
sive disasters, with two outliers: Italy earthquakes in 2012—a
sequence of earthquakes and aftershocks—and the Costa Rica
earthquake in 2012—during which a Caribbean-wide tsunami
watch was issued, resulting in a large volume of caution and
advice messages that are typically more prominent in pro-
gressive crises.
A similar picture emerges in the case of clusters by distribu-
tion of sources, shown in Figure 3(b). In this case, there is
a large cluster dominated by human-induced crises (on the
top), followed by two small clusters encompassing only nat-
ural hazards, and the Singapore haze 2013 as an outlier (this
haze was caused by a mix of natural and human causes). Fur-
ther, the large cluster on the top is dominated by instantaneous
events (with two exceptions, Typhoon Yolanda and Sardinia
Floods in 2013), while in the other clusters the events are pro-
gressive, excepting Italy earthquakes in 2012.
Furthermore, while the events development and type arise as
the main factors impacting the clusters composition, in both
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we also notice that the clusters are be-
ing dominated by either diffused (top cluster by information
type and bottom clusters by information source) or focalized
events (the remaining clusters). The clusters tendency to en-
compass events that are similar along all these dimensions is
likely explained by the dependency among the crisis dimen-
sions (e.g., typically, the progressive events are also diffused
and human-induced crises tend to be focalized).
DISCUSSION
Disasters are common events that occur regularly; the United
Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
recorded 394 disasters caused by natural hazards in the 2002–
2011 period [1]. While disasters take place often, and may be
caused by similar hazards and/or human actions, each event is
unique [36] (pag. 5). Regardless of their distinct nature, and
of variations in individual reactions and responses, common-
alities across crises exist. Sociologists of disaster point out
that despite the differences among disaster agents (e.g. flood,
earthquake, bomb, fire), there are actions that planning and
emergency response teams must take that are independent of
these differences [47].
This brings us to an interesting juxtaposition; the types and
amounts of information broadcast on Twitter differ across
each of the 26 specific crises we studied. This can be viewed
as a display of the uniqueness of each event. In some cases the
most common tweet in one crisis (e.g. eyewitness accounts in
the Singapore haze crisis in 2013) was absent in another (e.g.
eyewitness accounts in the Savar building collapse in 2013).
Furthermore, even two events of the same type in the same
country (e.g. Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 and Typhoon Pablo
in 2012, both in the Philippines), may look quite different
vis-à-vis the information on which people tend to focus.
Yet, when we look at the Twitter data at a meta-level, our
analysis reveals commonalities among the types of informa-
tion people tend to be concerned with, given the particular di-
mensions of the situations such as hazard category (e.g. nat-
ural, human-induced, geophysical, accidental), hazard type
(e.g. earthquake, explosion), whether it is instantaneous or
progressive, and whether it is focalized or diffused. For in-
stance, caution and advice tweets from government sources
are more common in progressive disasters than in instanta-
neous ones. The similarities do not end there. When grouping
crises automatically based on similarities in the distributions
of different classes of tweets, we also realize that despite the
variability, human-induced crises tend to be more similar to
each other than to natural hazards.
This leads us to believe that we can view Twitter as a medium
through which the nuance of disaster events is highlighted or
amplified; it is a tool that becomes incorporated into the social
construction of the disaster event, and through which we can
understand the detailed differences on a large scale when we
look closely at Twitter data. At the same time, when we look
at those same data at a higher level, we see commonalities
and patterns.
Practitioners, including emergency managers, public infor-
mation officers, and those who develop the tools used by
them, should consider that the proportion of tweets that
are relevant for a specific purpose will almost invariably be
smaller than the proportion of the tweets that are not. For in-
stance, if an analyst or an application focuses on content that
is not present in mainstream or other Internet media sources,
and wants to exclude content provided by outsiders who are
not affected by the crisis, then it will have to skip through
80% of the tweets on average. The same holds for informa-
tion types. If we group together the four main types we used
(affected individuals, donations and volunteering, caution and
advice, and infrastructure and utilities), they cover on average
47% of the tweets related to a crisis. This implies that if an
application wants to focus on these information types, at least
53% of the messages will have to be discarded. These are
lower bounds, as often not all of the tweets of a given type
will be relevant for a particular application. Noise is a natural
consequence of the diversity of information in this medium.
Developers should consider that emergency response includes
a set of actions that have to be taken in preparation of any cri-
sis event, plus a broad space for adaptability in response to
specific events [47]. Hence, tools to process social media in
disaster should consider that there are broad classes of infor-
mation that are likely to be prevalent, and can be anticipated
to occur. At the same time, a substantial volume of messages
will depend on specificities of every event, and tools must
incorporate methods to adaptively detect and process them.
CONCLUSIONS
Our systematic examination of a diverse set of crisis situa-
tions uncovered substantial variability across crises, as well
as patterns and consistencies. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the largest transversal study on tweets broadcast in re-
sponse to various international disaster and crisis situations.
Future Work
The high-level patterns we have found lay the foundations for
future studies that go into the detail of each specific crisis or
each specific information category analyzed.
However, we note that we did not cover all possible crisis
situations. For instance, we did not include human-induced
progressive or diffused situations, which are less common
than the classes we did study. The former (human-induced
progressive) mostly refers to politically-driven crises, such as
instability leading to demonstrations, riots, and/or civil wars.
The latter (human-induced diffused) in recent years have been
mostly wars affecting an entire country or region, or less-
common, large-scale industrial accidents such as the oil spill
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Additionally, the manage-
ment of a crisis is typically divided into phases: mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery [35, 47]. The work we
present here is concerned mostly with the response phase and
partially with the recovery phase, as these attract the bulk of
social media activities [23]. Language and cultural differ-
ences could also be included as explicit crisis dimensions [20,
37], together with temporal factors. Microblogging practices
are likely to evolve over the years, and our collections cover
a period of just about 20 months. The study of other crisis
dimensions, other types of crises and other phases, will cer-
tainly deepen our findings.
Methodologically, we asked crowdsource workers to match
each tweet to one specific class. This simplifies the label-
ing process and makes the presentation of the results clearer.
When workers associate a tweet to multiple classes, it may
be possible that the distributions change. Employing profes-
sional emergency managers as annotators instead of crowd-
source workers may lead to further results. Finally, assessing
the quality, credibility, or veracity of the information in each
tweet is relevant for most of the potential consumers of this
data. However, we note that in these cases the cost of the an-
notation would certainly increase—or the amount of labeled
data would decrease.
Data Release
The tweets used in this research, and the labels collected
through the crowdsourced annotation, are available for re-
search purposes at http://crisislex.org/
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APPENDIX
• Table 4 containing the list of keywords used to collect
data from each crisis.
• Tables 5 and 6 depicting temporal distributions of tweets
on each crisis for each type, and for each source.
Table 4. List of keywords used to collect data for each of the crises in this study.
Year Crisis Name Keywords #Kw
2012 Italy earthquakes earthquake italy; quake italy; #modena; #sanfelice; san felice; modena terremoto; modena earthquake;
modena quake; #norditalia; terremoto italia; #terremoto;
11
2012 Colorado wildfires #cofire; #boulderfire; #colorado; #wildfire; #waldocanyonfire; #waldofire; #waldocanyon; col-
orado springs; #highparkfire; #flagstafffire; #littlesandfire; #treasurefire; #statelinefire; #springerfire;
#lastchancefire; #fourmilefire; #4milefire; #fourmilecanyonfire; #boulderfire; #bisonfire; colorado
wildfire; colorado wildfires; colorado fire; colorado fires; boulder fire; boulder fires; boulder wildfires;
boulder wildfires;
28
2012 Philipinnes Floods #rescueph; #reliefph; #floodsph; #prayforthephilippine; manila flood; manila floods; philippine floods;
philippine flood; #floodph; #phalert; #habagat;
11
2012 Venezuela refinery explosion paraguana refinery; venezuela refinery; paraguaná refinery; #paraguana; #paraguaná; amuay refinery;
venezuelan refinery; #amuay; paraguaná refinería; paraguana refineria; amuay refineria; amuay refin-
ería; #falcon; #falcón; refinería venezuela; refineria venezuela; refinería paraguana;
17
2012 Costa Rica earthquake #temblorcr; #terremotocr; #costarica; #terremoto; costa rica quake; costa rica earthquake; costa rica
temblor; costa rica terremoto; #creq; costa rican quake; costa rican earthquake; #quake; #earthquake;
13
2012 Guatemala earthquake #sismo; #guatemala; tiemblaenguate; temblorgt; terremotogt; temblor guatemala; terremoto guatemala;
sismo guatemala; earthquake guatemala; quake guatemala; #sanmarcos; #terremotoguatemala;
#tremorguatemala;
13
2012 Typhoon Pablo #pabloph; #reliefph; #bopha; #typhoonpablo; #typhoonbopha; typhoon bopha; typhoon pablo; #bopha;
#pablo; #typhoon; #walangpasok; #mindanao; #visayas; #hinatuan; #rescueph; #pablosafetytips; #cdo;
#strongerph;
18
2013 Brazil nightclub fire #forçasantamaria; boate kiss; #boatekiss; #santamaria; #tragédiaemsm; #tragediaemsm; #todosdese-
jamforçasasantamaria; #brazilfire; #brazil fire; brazil nightclub; #brasildesejaforçasasvitimasdesanta-
maria; #prayforsantamaria; #prayforbrazil;
13
2013 Queensland Floods #qldflood; #bigwet; queensland flood; australia flood; #qldfloods; queensland floods; australia floods;
queensland flooding; qld flood; qld floods; qld flooding; australia flooding;
12
2013 Russian Meteor #метеорит; #meteor; #meteorite; russia meteor; russian meteor; #russianmeteor; #chelyabinsk; #че-
лябинск;
8
2013 Boston Bombings boston explosion; boston explosions; boston blast; boston blasts; boston tragedies; boston tragedy;
prayforboston; boston attack; boston attacks; boston terrorist; boston terrorists; boston tragic; boston-
marathon; boston marathon; boston explosive; boston bomb; boston bombing; dzhokhar; tsarnaev;
marathon attack; marathon explosion; marathon explosions; marathon tragedies; marathon tragedy;
marathon blasts; marathon blast; marathon attacks; marathon bomb; marathon bombing; marathon
explosive;
30
2013 Savar building collapse #savar; #bangladesh; bangladesh collapse; #ranaplaza; savar bangladesh; savar collapse; rana plaza; 7
2013 West Texas Explosion #westexplosion; west explosion; waco explosion; texas explosion; texas fertilizer; prayfortexas; pray-
forwest; waco tx; west tx; west texas; waco texas; #west; #waco; westexplosion; west explosion; waco
explosion; tx explosion; fertilizer explosion; prayfortexas; prayforwest; westtx; wacotx; west texas;
waco texas; west tx; waco tx; texas fertilizer; west fertilizer; waco fertilizer;
29
2013 Alberta Floods alberta flood; #abflood; canada flood; alberta flooding; alberta floods; canada flooding; canada floods;
#yycflood; #yycfloods; #yycflooding; calgary flood; calgary flooding; calgary floods;
13
2013 Singapore Haze #sghaze; singapore haze; #hazyday; blamethehaze; mustbehaze; #sg #haze; singapore #hazy; 7
2013 Lac-Megantic train crash #lacmegantic; #lacmégantic; #lacmég; #lacmeg; #tragedielacmegantic; #tragédielacmégantic; #mé-
gantic; lac mégantic; lac megantic; quebec train explosion; quebec train derailment; quebec train crash;
quebec oil train; canada train oil; canada train oil; canadian train oil;
16
2013 Spain train crash compostela train; spain train; tren compostela; españa tren; #santiagocompostela; #accidentesantiago; 6
2013 Manila Floods baha manila; #maringph; #rescueph; #reliefph; #floodsph; #prayforthephilippine; manila flood; manila
floods; philippine floods; philippine flood; #floodph; #phalert; #safenow; #trafficph; #habagat; #mar-
ing; #maringupdates;
17
2013 Colorado Floods #cofloodrelief; colorado floods; colorado flooding; #coloradoflood; #coflood; #opcoflood; #boulder-
flood; #longmont;
8
2013 Australia wildfires #nswfires; #nswbushfire; #nswbushfires; #nswrfs; #sydneybushfire; #sydneyfire; #sydneyfires; #syd-
neybushfires; nsw #bushfire; #redoctober; australia #bushfire; #faulconbridge; #nswrfs; #bushfire syd-
ney; nsw fire; #prayforaustralia; #prayfornsw; australia fire; sydney fire; nsw fires; australia fires;
sydney fires; prayfornsw;
23
2013 Bohol earthquake #phquake; #pheq; #phtrenchquake; philippines earthquake; philippines quake; ph earthquake; ph
quake; #phtrenchquake; #prayforthephilippines; #rescueph; #reliefph; #tabangbohol; #tabangcebu;
#bohol; #cebu; prayforvisayas; prayforbohol; #lindol;
18
2013 Glasgow helicopter crash #prayerforglasgow; #helicopter; glasgow helicopter; #clutha; helicopter crash; 5
2013 LA Airport Shootings lax shooting; lax shootings; lax shooter; lax suspect; #laxshooting; lax airport; #lax; airport shooting;
airport shootings; #losangeles airport; lax victims;
11
2013 NYC train crash #newyork derailment; ny derailment; nyc derailment; #metronorth derailment; #spuyten duyvil; #nyc-
train; new york derailment; metro north derailment; #metronorth derailment; ny train crash; nyc train
crash; newyork train crash; york train crash; #metronorth train crash; metro north crash; ny train de-
railed; york train derailed; nyc train derailed;
18
2013 Sardinia Floods sardinia floods; sardinia flooding; cyclone cleopatra; #cyclonecleopatra; #sardinia; sardegna alluvione;
#cleopatra alluvione; #sardegna;
8
2013 Typhoon Yolanda #typhoonyolanda; #yolandaph; #yolanda; #haiyan; #tracingph; #floodph; #safenow; #rescueph; #re-
liefph; typhoon yolanda; typhoon haiyan; typhoon philippines; #typhoonhaiyan; #typhoonaid; #philip-
pines; #typhoon; #supertyphoon; #redcrossphilippines; #yolandaactionweekend; rescue ph; typhoon
ph; super typhoon;
22
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